Suchergebnisse

Altres ajuts: Acord transformatiu CRUE-CSIC ; Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovación (ANII) of Uruguay (POS_EXT_2018_1_153809) ; In this article, we empirically analyze the impact of central and subnational government spending on human development in a sample of 57 developed and developing countries over the period 2000-18. Specifically, we focus on the effects of health and education public expenditure on the Human Development Index (HDI) and its dimensions (life expectancy, education, and income). Applying data panel analysis, our empirical evidence shows the importance of central and subnational government health expenditure positively impacting on HDI and each of its components, while in the case of the education expenditure, this positive effect is only confirmed on the educational dimension of HDI. Our study shows how governments can stimulate human development, improving the well-being of citizens, by allocating more resources to healthcare through the different administrative levels.

En el presente capítulo se analizan la estructura y evolución de las disparidades fiscales regionales en Uruguay durante el período que se extiende de 2006 a 2013. A su vez, se considera el rol de la implementación de un nuevo sistema de transferencias ecualizadoras con el objeto de lograr y consolidar un territorio con un mayor nivel de homogeneidad o cohesión fiscal de los diferentes gobiernos departamentales (GD) de Uruguay

In this paper we consider how government quality mediates the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities. Previous work has argued that fiscal decentralization has the potential to reduce income differences across regions but that this potential may not be realized because of governance problems associated with sub-national authorities. Our empirical evidence based on a sample of 24 OECD countries over the period 1984 to 2006 lends a measure of support to this idea. We find that fiscal decentralization promotes regional convergence in high government quality settings but, worryingly, it leads to wider regional disparities in countries with poor governance. Resumen: En este artículo consideramos cómo la calidad de la gobernanza interviene en la relación entre la descentralización fiscal y las disparidades regionales. Los estudios anteriores sostienen que la descentralización fiscal tiene el potencial de reducir las diferencias de ingresos entre regiones, pero que este potencial no se logra manifestar debido a problemas de gobernanza asociados con las autoridades subnacionales. Nuestras pruebas empíricas, con base en una muestra de 24 países de la OCDE durante el período 1984 a 2006 apoyan en cierta medida esta idea. Hallamos que la descentralización fiscal fomenta la convergencia regional en escenarios con una alta calidad de gobernanza, pero que, de forma preocupante, conduce a disparidades regionales más amplias en países con una pobre gobernanza ; The authors would like to thank the participants of the Regional Studies AssociationWinter Conference 2012 and three anonymous referees for their kind and helpful comments. We would also like to acknowledge financial support from projects ECO2010-21668-C03-02 and ECO2012-31081 (Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia) as well as 2009SGR-2013 and XREPP (Direcció General de Recerca). The usual disclaimers apply

The construction sector, whether privately or publicly financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention making it vulnerable to corruption. Consistent with this, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of malfeasance in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995-2011. We control for a range of potentially confounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to increase perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain.

This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.